Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2004

State of Utah v. Marcelino Cruz : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Christopher Keen; Keen Law Offices; Attorney for Appellant.
Karen A. Clucznik; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Richard
A. Parmley; Deputy Weber County Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Cruz, No. 20041055 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5418

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

l»«II««liilCOURl
II

II iN II M i l i u m 1 1

ii

• i | II i.

ill

MINI

Ihl MMIIII IIHIII'IHII IIIIIIIHniH'HIHilH n H . . — »

—

Mlihtiff/AprielWi
|Up04105SCA
v.

1

MAfiHWlNO CRUni
P^iidintMlppfflNll
&FAP,

1ROM SENT:

sjlON OF A. C
p FfUBE m
§ 58-37-$
HER CfO

|}TO]j»HElk
Officers, L|
t^vfn Square
h University
h 84606
YFORU

RENT
EJBSTA1
BGREE
i004), I
MORAB

IfUILTYPLEATO
WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE
pNY, IN VIOLATION OF Ul AH
ECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
j ^ LYON PRESIDING

[CZNIK (7912)
:y General
HURTLEFF (4666)
torncy General
last 300 South, 6th Floor
140854
ity, Utah 84114-0854
.366-0180
A. PARMLEY
County Attorney
)R APPELLEE
FILED
.
UTAH APPELLATE COl IR 1

JOB

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20041055-CA
v.
MARCELINO CRUZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM SENTENCING AFTER ENTRY OF GUILTY PLEA TO
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE
IN A DRUG FREE ZONE, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH
CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (West 2004), IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT, WEBER COUNTY, THE HONORABLE MICHAEL D. LYON PRESIDING

J. CHRISTOPHER KEEN
Keen Law Officers, LLC
Jamestown Square
3585 North University Avenue, #250
Provo, Utah 84606
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK (7912)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
RICHARD A. PARMLEY
Deputy Weber County Attorney
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN SENTENCING
DEFENDANT TO THE STATUTORY PRISON TERM FOR FIRST DEGREE
FELONY WHERE THE COURT'S DECISION WAS BASED ON THE
SEVERITY OF DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL CONDUCT, NOT ON
DEFENDANT'S ALIENAGE
1.

2.

5

Because defendant did not raise his claims below, this Court may reach
them only if defendant can show that the trial court's sentencing decision
was plain error

6

Defendant's plain error claims fail because his assertion that the trial court
sentenced him based solely on his illegal alien status is simply not
supported by the record

8

CONCLUSION
ADDENDUM A.

12
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV
Utah Const. Art. I, § 24
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (West 2004)
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (West 2004)

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATE CASES
Beehive Medical Electrics, Inc. v. Square D. Co., 669 P.2d 859 (Utah 1983)

6, 7

State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, 63 P.3d 731

8

State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, 82P.3d211

9

State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, 95 P.3d 276

6, 7

State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346

6, 7, 8

State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989)

6, 7

State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, 94 P.3d 186

2, 8

State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1995)

7

State v. Rhodes, 818P.2d 1048 (Utah App. 1991)

9

State v. Rodriguez, 2002 UT App 119,46 P.3d 767

9

State v. Schultz, 2002 UT App 366, 58 P.3d 879
State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, 73 P.3d 991

6, 7
9

State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987)

6, 7

Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457 (Utah App. 1996)

6, 7

FEDERAL STATUTES
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV

2
STATE STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (West 2004)

cover page

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (West 2004)

2, 9

ii

Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1 (West 2004)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2002)

1

Utah Const. Art. I, § 24

2, 8

iii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20041055-CA
v.
MARCELINO CRUZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from sentencing after he pleaded guilty to possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony.
This Court has pour-over jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court commit plain error in sentencing defendant to the
statutory prison term for a first degree felony where the court's
sentencing decision was based on the severity of defendant's criminal
conduct, not his alienage?
Defendant claims that the trial court both abused its discretion and violated his
constitutional rights to equal protection when it sentenced him to prison rather than
placing him on probation. Defendant did not preserve either of these claims below.
Thus, the trial court's sentencing decision may only be reviewed for plain error. To
establish plain error, defendant must show that '"(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should

have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error was harmful, i.e., absent the error,
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the [defendant].'" State
v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29,116, 94 P.3d 186 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are attached at Addendum A:
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; Utah Const. Art. I, § 24;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (West 2004);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (West 2004).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS1
After conducting two controlled buys of cocaine and methamphetamine from
defendant on August 31 and September 1, 2004, the Weber/Morgan Narcotics Strike
Force (the "Strike Force") obtained a warrant to search defendant's home and vehicle for
drugs (R. 23-28).
The Strike Force executed the warrant on September 8, 2004 (R. 10). A search of
defendant revealed approximately one ounce of cocaine in his pants pocket (R. 10). A
search of defendant's truck revealed an additional three ounces of cocaine and one pound
of marijuana (R. 10-11; R. 70:7). A search of defendant's home revealed additional
cocaine as well as methamphetamine and a scale (R. 11; R. 70:7). Defendant

1

This Statement of Facts is taken from the affidavit in support of a search warrant
executed on defendant prior to the charges, the probable cause statement generated after
the search, the factual basis for defendant's plea offered at defendant's plea hearing, and
the State's argument at sentencing.
2

acknowledged that he possessed the cocaine and marijuana for distribution (R. 11, 37; R.
70:7) Defendant's home was within 1000 feet of a mortuary and a restaurant (R. 11; R.
70:7).
On September 135 2004, defendant was charged with one count of possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to distribute in a drug free zone, a
first degree felony; one count of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with
intent to distribute in a drug free zone, a first degree felony; one count of possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana) with intent to distribute in a drug-free zone, a second
degree felony; and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor
(R. 4-5).
On October 7, 2004, defendant waived a preliminary hearing and entered a guilty
plea to one count of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to
distribute in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony. In return, the State asked that the
three other charges be dismissed (R. 32-33, 35-49). With a certified court interpreter
assisting him, defendant was informed that a first degree felony carried a prison term of
five years to life and that the State would be asking that the prison term be imposed (R.
36, 43; R. 70:2-3, 8). Defendant indicated that he would request a lighter sentence,
followed by deportation (R. 70:3). Defendant understood that his request "does not bind
the State nor the judge in any way" (R. 70:3-5).
Defendant's sentencing hearing was held on November 18, 2004 (R. 71). At the
hearing, defendant asked to be sentenced to 180 days in jail and then be released for
3

deportation (R. 71:2). Based on the quantity of drugs found in defendant's possession at
the time of the crimes, the State recommended prison (R. 71:2-4).
The trial court agreed with the State and sentenced defendant to an indeterminate
term of five years to life in prison (R. 50-51). In announcing sentence, the trial court
explained that the severity of defendant's criminal conduct justified that sentence:
Let me say this. This is a difficult case. It is not uncommon
for this Court to receive recommendations from the probation
department on people who are here illegally to just put them on court
probation—give them a suspended prison sentence, place them on
court probation and give them a stiff jail sentence and then make as a
condition of court probation that they not return to the county
illegally.
And in some instances involving simple possession charges or
maybe even a small amount that's being distributed, I sometimes
don't have a heartburn with that. But I think the—the State today
has raised a very good issue and that is that this was—it involves a
large amount of narcotics, it was in a drug-free zone, it's a first
degree felony, that maybe from time to time there ought to be an
example made that—that when you commit a very serious crime,
which this is, that there ought not to be court probation. There ought
to be a prison commitment. And I think this is one.
(R. 71:5-6).
Defendant timely appealed (R. 53-54). His subsequent pro se motion to withdraw
his plea was denied (R. 58-61). The supreme court transferred the matter to this Court for
disposition (R. 66). After defendant's original appellate counsel filed an Anders brief,
defendant retained new counsel, who then filed a brief challenging defendant's sentence
on the merits.

4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his
constitutional rights to equal protection by sentencing him to a prison term. Defendant
claims that the trial court improperly sentenced him to prison based solely on his alienage.
Defendant did not raise these claims below. Thus, to prevail on appeal, defendant
must establish that the trial court committed plain error in sentencing him to prison.
Defendant cannot show plain error here because the trial court properly based its
sentencing decision on the severity of defendant's criminal conduct.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN
SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO THE STATUTORY PRISON
TERM FOR A FIRST DEGREE FELONY WHERE THE COURT'S
DECISION WAS BASED ON THE SEVERITY OF DEFENDANT'S
CRIMINAL CONDUCT, NOT ON DEFENDANT'S ALIENAGE
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in sentencing him to prison where his
presentence investigation report recommended probation and deportation. See Aplt. Br.
at 7-14. Defendant claims that "the only reason the defendant drew a stiffer sentence than
recommended by the probation department was . . . because of his non-citizen status in
the United States—a factor which should have no bearing on whether defendant was
probation-eligible." Aplt. Br. at 8; see also id. at 9, 12. Defendant asserts that,
consequently, the trial court's decision to sentence defendant to prison "violates equal
protection . .. and was an abuse of the court's discretion." Aplt. Br. at 14.

5

As the record makes clear, it was defendant, not the trial court, that sought to have
defendant's sentence based on his alienage. The trial court committed no error in
rejecting defendant's request and instead basing its decision on the severity of defendant's
criminal conduct, not his alienage.
1.

Because defendant did not raise his claims below, this Court may
reach them only if defendant can show that the trial court's
sentencing decision was plain error.

Defendant did not preserve his claims below. Thus, this Court may consider them
only for plain error.
The general rule in criminal cases is that "'a contemporaneous objection or some
form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court
record before an appellate court will review such claim[s].'" State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d
1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting Statev. Tillman, 750P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987)); see
also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^f 11, 10 P.3d 346. The objection below must be
"'specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error . . . complained of.'"
Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah App. 1996)
(quoting Beehive Medical Elecs., Inc. v. Square D. Co., 669 P.2d 859, 860 (Utah 1983)).
In other words, "the issue must be 'sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness before
the trial court and must be supported by evidence or relevant legal authority.'" State v.
Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^ 13, 95 P.3d 276 (quoting State v. Schultz, 2002 UT App 366, Tf 19,
58 P.3d 879 (additional quotation marks)).

6

This preservation rule "applies to every claim, including constitutional questions,
unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error'
occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74,111; see also State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5
(Utah 1995) ("Because Pledger does not argue that 'exceptional circumstances' or 'plain
error' justifies a review of the issue, we decline to consider it on appeal.").
In this case, defendant's only argument at sentencing was that, in order to facilitate
his deportation, defendant should be sentenced to a minimal jail term and then released to
the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"). Thus, in his first
comments to the court at sentencing, defendant asked that he be ordered to "serve
whatever time in the Weber County Jail you have him serve, and then allow his
deportation as per the [pre-sentence investigation report] recommendation" (R. 71:2).
Defendant initially suggested that he be given 180 days in jail (R. 71:2).
Then, when the prosecutor "disagree[d] with the [PSI's] recommendations" and
argued that defendant's crime was "so serious that it warrants commitment to the prison"
(R. 71:2-3), defendant indicated that if the trial court wanted to sentence him to a year in
jail, "that would be fine, too" (R. 71:5).
Defendant never objected to the trial court's sentence as improperly based on his
illegal status. Consequently, defendant's appellate claims asserting that error were not
preserved below. Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 13; Holgate, 2000 UT 74,111; Johnson, 11A
P.2d at 1144; Tillman, 750 P.2d at 551; Beehive Medical Elecs., Inc., 669 P.2d at 860;
Schultz, 2002 UT App 366, If 19; Tolman, 912 P.2d at 460. Thus, this Court may reach
7

defendant's claims only if defendant can establish plain error. See, e.g., State v.
Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ^ 41, 63 P.3d 731; Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11.
Defendant cannot establish plain error.
2.

Defendant's plain error claims fail because his assertion that the
trial court sentenced him based solely on his illegal alien status is
simply not supported by the record.

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to a prison term
because it based that decision solely on defendant's illegal alien status. Defendant claims
that the trial court's ruling was an abuse of discretion and a violation of his constitutional
rights to equal protection and the uniform operation of the laws. See Aplt. Br. at 9-10.2
Because the record does not support defendant's contention that the trial court's sentence
was based solely on his illegal status, defendant's plain error claims fail.
To establish plain error, defendant must show that "'(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error was harmful, i.e.,
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
[defendant].'" State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, If 16, 94 P.3d 186 (quoting State
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993)).
In the context of a challenge to the trial court's sentencing decision, a defendant's
burden is particularly high. First, this Court "will not overturn a sentence unless it
exceeds statutory or constitutional limits, the judge failed to consider all the legally
2

U.S. Const, amend. XIV provides in relevant part that "[n]o State shall. .. deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Utah Const. Art. I, §
24 provides that "[a] 11 laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."
8

relevant factors or the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute abuse
of discretion." State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, \ 3, 73 P.3d 991 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
In other words, an"' appellate court can properly find abuse [of discretion] only if
it can be said that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.'"
State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, f 6, 82 P.3d 211 (citation omitted). Consequently,
"[t]he decision whether to grant probation is within the complete discretion of the trial
court." State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah App. 1991); see also State v.
Rodriguez, 2002 UT App 119, \ 3. 46 P.3d 767. Stated differently, "[t]he trial court has
broad discretion in imposing sentence within the statutory scope provided by the
legislature." Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051.
In this case, the trial court denied defendant probation and sentenced him to serve
an indeterminate term of five years to life in prison (R. 71:5-6). The trial court's sentence
was "within the statutory scope provided by the legislature." Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051;
see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) (West 2004) (providing that person convicted of
first degree felony "may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term . . . of
not less than five years and which may be for life"). Thus, the court's sentence fell within
the broad discretion granted trial courts in deciding sentences. Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051.
Nonetheless, defendant claims that the trial court's sentence constitutes plain error.
Specifically, defendant claims that the court committed plain error because it sentenced
defendant to prison based "solely" on his "non-citizen status in the United States," which,
9

defendant asserts, constitutes an abuse of discretion and a violation of his constitutional
rights to equal protection. Aplt. Br. at 8-9, 12, 14. Defendant's claims fail, however,
because his contentions that the trial court improperly considered his alienage in
sentencing him are simply not borne out by the record.
For example, in support of his abuse of discretion claim, defendant quotes the trial
court as stating, "'it is not uncommon . . . to receive recommendations from the probation
department... on people who are here illegally to .. . give them a suspended prison
sentence.5" Aplt. Br. at 8 (quoting R.71:5).

v

Defendant then follows this accurate quotation with the following one: '"[But]
when you commit a very serious crime, which this is [andyou are non-citizen], that there
ought not to be court probation.'" Id. (emphasis added).
However, the language defendant adds in brackets—which implies that the trial
court expressly compared defendant to a citizen committing the same crime and then
expressly punished defendant more harshly than it would have such a citizen— misstates
of the record.
As previously noted, the trial court's entire comment prior to sentencing defendant
consists of the following two paragraphs:
Let me say this. This is a difficult case. It is not uncommon
for this Court to receive recommendations from the probation
department on people who are here illegally to just put them on court
probation—give them a suspended prison sentence, place them on
court probation and give them a stiff jail sentence and then make as a
condition of court probation that they not return to the county
illegally.
10

And in some instances involving simple possession charges or
maybe even a small amount that's being distributed, I sometimes
don't have a heartburn with that. But I think the—the State today
has raised a very good issue and that is that this was—it involves a
large amount of narcotics, it was in a drug-free zone, it's a first
degree felony, that maybe from time to time there ought to be an
example made that—that when you commit a very serious crime,
which this is, that there ought not to be court probation. There ought
to be a prison commitment. And I think this is one.
(EL 71:5-6).
Nowhere in these paragraphs does the trial court even implicitly compare
defendant's criminal conduct to that of citizens, let alone suggest that defendant was
being sentenced more harshly than would a citizen who had committed the same crime.
Thus, nothing in the record supports defendant's contention that, unlike defendant here,
"citizens who commit [similarly] serious drug offenses .. . are always eligible for
probation." Aplt. Br. at 8. Nor does anything in the record support defendant's contention
that, "as glaringly exposed by the district court's pronouncements, the only reason the
defendant drew a stiffer sentence than recommended by the probation department was
solely because of his non-citizen status in the United States." Aplt. Br. at 8. Nor does
anything in the record support defendant's contention that "the district court has created
two classes of people . . . [ , ] non-citizen defendants and citizen defendants [which] have
been subjected to significantly disparate treatment based solely on the basis of alienage."
Aplt. Br. at 13.
Simply put, the trial court did not base its sentencing decision on defendant's
illegal alien status. Rather, the trial court's sentencing decision was based on its
11

conclusion that, although illegal aliens often receive probation followed by deportation
for drug offenses, defendant's criminal conduct—which "involve[d] a large amount of
narcotics,. . . was in a drug-free zone, [and was] a first degree felony"—deserved a
harsher sentence, i.e., "a prison commitment," than did conduct "involving simple
possession charges or maybe even a small amount that's being distributed" (R. 71-5-6).
In other words, the trial court's sentencing decision was based on the severity of
defendant's criminal conduct, not on defendant's illegal alien status.
Because nothing in the record supports defendant's claims that the trial court
sentenced him to prison based solely on his illegal alien status, defendant cannot show
error, let alone obvious error, in the trial court's sentencing decision. Consequently, both
defendant's abuse of discretion claim and his constitutional claims challenging the court's
decision fail.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's conviction
and sentence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

MARKL. SHURTLEFF
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Addendum A

Addendum A

United States Const. Amend. XIV
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion,
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which
the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twentyone years of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States,
or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as
an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive
or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any
State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or
rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.

Utah Const. Art. I, § 24
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

§ 76-3—203. Felony conviction—Indeterminate term of imprisonment
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, unless the statute provides
otherwise, for a term of not less than five years and which may be for life.
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, unless the statute provides
otherwise, for a term of not less than one year nor more than 15 years.
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, unless the statute provides
otherwise, for a term not to exceed five years.

§ 77—18-1. Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—ProbationSupervision—Presentence
investigation—Standards—Confidentiality—
Terms and conditions—Termination, revocation, modification, or extension—Hearings—Electronic monitoring
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the
plea in abeyance agreement.
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of
any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court
may place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections
except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private
organization; or

(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the
department is with the department.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the
sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court.
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These standards
shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level
of services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to
the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis
for review and comment prior to adoption by the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to
implement the supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other
criteria as they consider appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations
subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards.
(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence
for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence
investigation report from the department or information from other sources
about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact
statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the
effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement
of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the defendant in
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act.

(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404,
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the
department.
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to
the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the
prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing.
Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have
not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall
be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an
additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report
with the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be
resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on
the record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be
waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the
defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may
require that the defendant:
(a) perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs;
(hi) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally
liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs;
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation by
the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate;
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of
electronic monitoring;
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including
the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest
in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act;
and
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; and

(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation
diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's
own expense if the defendant has not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being placed on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of:
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under
Section 64-13-21 during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with
Subsection 77-27-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordance
with Subsection (10).
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or
class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions.
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of :he probation period under
Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account
receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the
limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the account receivable.
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the
registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and
immediately transfer responsibility to collect the account to the Office of
State Debt Collection.
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor,
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of
court.
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State
Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all
cases when termination of supervised probation will occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable.
(ll)(a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke
probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term
unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time

toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the
hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant
by the court.
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the
probationer has violated the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a
finding that the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that
authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable
cause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is
justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be
served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit
and an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked,
modified, or extended.
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the
hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance,
(hi) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be
represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for
him if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present
evidence.
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of
the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning
by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own
behalf, and present evidence.
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or
that the entire probation term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the
sentence previously imposed shall be executed.

(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of
the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah
State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the
court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the
state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13).
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act Notwithstanding Sections
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the
presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of
the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the
subject's authorized representative; or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided that
the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the crime
including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime on the
victim or the victim's household.
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation* under the supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections
76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5.
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home
confinement, including electronic monitoring, f 3r all individuals referred to
the department in accordance with Subsection (16).
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of
electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order of the
court.
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts.
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which
require:

(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times;
and
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored.
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this section,
it shall:
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections;
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the
defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of
the defendant; and
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to the department or the program provider.
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be
indigent by the court.
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this
section either directly or by contract with a private provider.

